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A decade ago, Professor Richard Epstein argued that
progressive rate income and estate taxation is an
uncompensated regulatory taking.' Nobody paid very much
attention. That is a pity, because the question has never been
definitively answered by the United States Supreme Court. This
Article is an attempt to answer that question, and do so in a
reasonably objective fashion.
In his book, Takings, Epstein presents a theoretical challenge
to the constitutional legitimacy of the welfare state. The book
was largely dismissed by academics, primarily because it stated a
* Calvin R. Massey is Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
1. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 295-305 (1985).
2. Everybody has opinions on this subject, as we all pay taxes. The issue of progressive
versus proportionate ("flat") taxation is highly politicized. I personally prefer
proportionate taxation on policy grounds. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA,
THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor
ProgresiveTaxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417,430-444 (1952), reprinted as UNIVERSI YOF
CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL REPRINT AND PAMPHLET SERIES No. 11. But I have an open mind
on the quite separate issue of whether progressive rate taxation is constitutionally
forbidden.
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conclusion that was unpalatable to the orthodoxy of the political
left that dominates academia.3 "For most reviewers, [Epstein's]
conclusions are so antithetical to conventional wisdom that they
discredit the entire book., 4 Although Epstein's theory is not
beyond cavil, it does deserve a fair look through the lens of
conventional current takings doctrine.5
Before the theoretical rubber hits the doctrinal road, I will
briefly recite the essence of Epstein's theory insofar as it applies
to progressive rate taxation. Then, in order to demonstrate what
issues are doctrinally open, I will present the views expressed by
the Supreme Court in prior constitutional challenges to the
validity of progressive rate taxation. Following that exercise, I
will trace the none-too-clear boundary between taxation and
taking. Finally, I will apply current regulatory takings doctrine to
the contention that progressive rate taxation is an
uncompensated regulatory taking.
A primer on nomenclature is in order. The term "progressive
rate taxation" refers to marginal rates (not the effective rates) of
taxation that increase with income. Marginal rates are the actual
tax rates applied to taxable income. Effective rates represent the
portion of a taxpayer's total income that must be paid to
extinguish a tax liability.6 The term "single rate" or "uniform

3. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1829 (1986); Joseph L. Sax, Book Review, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 279 (1986)
(reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 1); Thomas Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986).
4. Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1561, 1562 (1986) (citing reviews of Epstein's book).
5. When academics write about constitutional law, they are apt to deal with it as
theory. I am as guilty as anyone on that charge. However, my objective in this Article is to

apply doctrineto test how far "outside of the mainstream" Epstein really is. You will notice
that the courts do not rely very much on law review commentary anymore. See Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992); cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 112930 (1996). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the currently favored academic
theory of the Eleventh Amendment with the acid-tongued comment that
[t]he dissent.., disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together
from law review articles and its own version of historical events.... Its
undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in
Hans is a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication.
Id. The "undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of... Hans"
relied on by the dissent is, of course, the standard fare of most academic commentary on
Hans v. Louisiana,134 U.S. 1 (1890).
6. For example, suppose a taxation system exempts the first $5,000 of income from
tax, taxes the next $10,000 of income at 10%, the next $10,000 at 20%, and all income
above $25,000 at 30%. A taxpayer with a $50,000 total income would pay $10,500 in
taxes, consisting of a $1,000 tax (at 10%) on the income from $5,000 to $15,000, a
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rate" taxation refers to "proportional" or "proportionate rate"
taxation. Under proportional taxation, all taxpayers pay the
same proportion (for example, twenty percent) of their taxable
income in taxes. If any income is uniformly exempted from
taxation, proportional taxation will produce progressive effective
rates of taxation. A true "flat tax" is a tax that does not vary with
income-as, for example, an annual tax of $2,000 regardless of
income.8 This sort of "flat tax," which no one advocates, is quite
regressive in its effective rates. 9 Finally, "regressive rate" taxation
consists of marginal tax rates that decrease with income.
Regressive rate taxation will produce even more regressive rates
of effective taxation.1° No one seriously advocates regressive rate
taxation. Therefore the essential choice, as a policy matter, is
between progressive rate taxation and proportional, or singlerate, taxation. The question I explore here is whether the
Takings Clause forecloses the choice of progressive rate
taxation.
To spare those who read only introductions and conclusions
from flipping to the back, I will summarize my conclusions here.

$2,000 tax (at 20%) on the income from $15,000 to $25,000, and a $7,500 tax (at 30%)
on the income over $25,000. The taxpayer would pay an effective rate of tax of 21% on
the $50,000 total income. By contrast, a taxpayer with a $10,000 total income would pay
a total tax of $500, consisting of $500 (at 10%) on the income from $5,000 to $10,000.
This taxpayer's effective rate would be 5% of the $10,000 income.
7. For example, assume a 20% single rate with an exemption for the first $25,000 of
income. A taxpayer with $200,000 in total income would pay $35,000 in taxes and have
an effective rate of 17.5%. A taxpayer with a total income of $30,000 would pay $1,000 in
taxes and have an effective rate of 3.33%. Of course, in this example, no matter how
high the taxpayer's income, the effective rate of taxation would never quite reach the
single rate of 20%.
8. This differs considerably from the "flat tax" plans typically offered by those seeking
to reform the tax system. For example, Steve Forbes's fiat tax plan is in fact a
proportional tax that would tax income at a single 17% rate. In addition, the Forbes
plan provides for an up-front deduction from taxable income. The deduction feature
gives his overall tax plan a progressive effect. SeeAllan Sloan, Forbes Speaks From a Flat Tax
Bible, With a Litte PoliticalNumber-Fudging WASH. POST,Jan. 23, 1996, at 03.
9. For example, a taxpayer with $10,000 total income would pay an effective rate of
20% to extinguish a $2,000 tax liability, while a taxpayer with a total income of $100,000
would pay an effective rate of 2%.
10. Consider a taxation system that exempts the first $5,000 of income from tax, taxes
the next $10,000 of income at 30%, the next $10,000 at 20%, and all income above
$25,000 at 10%. A taxpayer with a $100,000 total income would pay $12,500 in taxes,
consisting of a $3,000 tax (at 30%) on the income from $5,000 to $15,000, a $2,000 tax
(at 20%) on the income from $15,000 to $25,000, and a $7,500 tax (at 10%) on the
income over $25,000. The taxpayer's effective rate would be 12.5% of the $100,000 total
income. By contrast, a taxpayer with a $10,000 total income would pay a total tax of
$1,500, consisting of $1,500 (at 30%) on the income from $5,000 to $10,000. This
taxpayer's effective rate would be 15% of the $10,000 income.
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The Supreme Court has never decided whether progressive
taxation is an uncompensated taking. Taxation is not immune
from the strictures of the Takings Clause. Supreme Court dicta
suggests that taxation is generally regarded as a fully
compensated taking. Although generally true, that idea breaks
down when applied to progressive taxation, which seizes a
disproportionate share of taxpayer incomes. The Takings Clause
requires that public burdens be shared by the entire polity
rather than borne by a select few. Progressive taxation burdens
the few for the benefit of the many.
The standard of review the Court employs for regulatory
takings is much stricter than the standard the Court employs
when deciding challenges to economic regulations under due
process or equal protection. Standard regulatory takings
doctrine reveals that the constitutional case for progressive
taxation is weak. The disproportional share of income taken by
progressive rates constitutes a permanent dispossession of
intangible property. If the Court were to accept conceptual
severance as applicable to taxable income, the portion of
income taken by progressive taxation would be considered an
uncompensated taking, either because it is a permanent
dispossession or because it deprives the taxpayer of all
economically viable use of that severed strand of property. Even
if the Court's ad hoc balancing test applies, there is some doubt
that the benefits of progressive taxation outweigh the private
costs imposed. In any case, States that impose progressive
income taxes may reach independent and differing conclusions
on these issues by interpreting their state constitutional
provisions concerning takings of private property for public use.
Analysis of this issue reveals that, within legal academia, there
is an uncritical acceptance of the premise that taxation is
immune from control by the Takings Clause. That premise is
faulty. And once the premise is exploded, it is clear that
important, legitimate issues are presented. It does not speak well
of law that these issues have been airily dismissed for over eight
decades as not even worth raising.
I. EPSTEIN'S THEORY

Epstein argues that the Constitution was an embodiment of
Lockean political theory. The Lockean social contract,
according to Epstein, requires "individuals [to] give up... their
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right to use force; what they are given in exchange is a superior
form of public protection. There is no contract as such, only a
network of forced exchanges designed to leave everyone better
off than before."" In this happy land of better-than-Pareto
optimality, 2 the Lockean social contract has increased the size
of the pie but left individuals with the same proportional slice as
before the formation of a political society. Or, to use the
overworked metaphor of the twentieth century, the rising tide of
political union has lifted everyone's boat.
But what rules follow after the formation of the Lockean
compact? Building on Locke's contention that the sovereign
merely succeeded to the private rights ceded by the contracting
individual members of society, Epstein asserts that "[t]he state
can acquire nothing by simple declaration of its will but must
justify its claims in terms of the rights of the individuals whom it
protects.', 3 In other words, the Lockean sovereign may never
exercise power that could not have been exercised by private
citizens. Louis XIV was correct in claiming "l'etat c'est mof' only
because he was a classically Hobbesian sovereign. The Lockean
sovereign may only claim that "l'etat c'est vous."
This difference is critical when it comes to deciding whether
the sovereign has "taken" a citizen's property. The absolute
monarch, like the 800-pound gorilla, can do what he wants. The
Lockean government, however, has committed an impermissible taking when its action would be a wrongful taking if
performed by a private party.
In the Epsteinian universe, property consists of the familiar
bundle of rights: use, possession, and disposition. 14 Whenever
governments infringe any of these rights in a manner that would
be actionable between private parties, a taking has occurred.
This means that zoning laws (which restrict use), rules barring
the ouster of unwanted speakers from shopping malls (which
infringe on exclusive possession), and bankruptcy laws (which

11. EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 15.
12. Pareto optimality exists when it is impossible to make an exchange without making
someone worse off. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY

LAW at xii (1975). Pareto superiority exists when an exchange will make at least one
person better off without worsening anyone's position. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (1992).

13. EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 12.
14. See id. at 58-59.
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force the disposition of contract rights) are all takings. 5
Moreover, Epstein applies the same analysis whether the
government action is directed against a single person or against
a large segment of the population. To Epstein, a taking has
occurred whenever
[the property of] a large number of individuals... has been
taken by acts which, if done against one of them alone, would
be covered by the eminent domain clause ....

....What stamps a government action as a taking
simpliciter is what it does to the property rights of each
individual who is subject to its actions ....The principles that
determine whether one person's property has been taken, in
whole or in part, also determine whether6 many people's
property has been taken in whole or in part.
To be sure, some commentators belittle this as mere formal
analysis.17 However, their explanations of why Epstein is wrong
rest mostly on perceived inconsistencies in Epstein's
methodology of constitutional interpretation 18 rather than on
refutation of his logic. For the moment, it is not important
whether Epstein or his critics are correct in treating large-scale
takings in the same way as individualized takings. We shall
return to this point in exploring the ill-defined frontier between
takings and taxation.
Having cast the takings net widely-" [aill regulations, all
taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are takings of
private property prima facie compensable by the state"9Epstein reveals that the mesh of the net is fairly coarse. Despite
his categorical assertions, Epstein admits that some regulations
and taxes are justified as legitimate exercises of the "police
power" that is "an inherent attribute of sovereignty at all levels
of government."0
The "police power" is not a one-size-fits-all garment, however.
In Epstein's view, the police power should be used solely to curb

See id. at 64-66, 88-89.
Id. at 93-94.
See, e.g., Sax, supranote 3, at 280.
See id. at 280-85.
19. EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 95.
20. Id. at 108.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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wrongful private conduct. Only "the wrong of the citizen
justifies conduct otherwise wrongful by the state as
representative of and in defense of its other citizens."21
Consequently, the state may impose regulations that would
otherwise be uncompensated takings when those regulations
prevent or punish wrongful private behavior.
The line between valid regulations and regulatory takings is
analogous to the line between self-defense and private necessity.
"Self-defense allows one to inflict harm without compensating
the person harmed, while private necessity creates only a
conditional privilege, which allows the harm to be inflicted but
only upon payment of compensation."2 In short, regulations
that nibble away at any of the sticks in the property rights
bundle are takings unless they are limited to public
enforcement of the sic utere maxim.2
An important specific exercise of the police power is the
creation of regulations designed to curb nuisances. Regulations
that operate to limit or prevent the use of property to create or
continue a nuisance are justified even if they would otherwise
constitute takings.2 4 Contemporary regulatory takings doctrine
embraces this principle by recognizing that regulation of
property is not a taking so long as the regulation does "no more
than duplicate the result [obtainable by private parties] ...
under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under
its complementary power to abate [public] nuisances."5 Such
regulations "[do] not proscribe a productive use that was
previously 2permissible
under relevant property and nuisance
6
principles."

In the Epsteinian conception, most government regulations
fall outside the scope of the police power and so constitute
prima facie takings. The breadth of this conclusion is softened
by Epstein's concession that compensation does not always have
to be in the form of cash. Some takings, particularly "largenumber takings" which are "in the form of regulations, taxation,

21. Id. at 111.
22. Id. at 110.
23. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes--common law maxim meaning that all should
use their property so as not to injure the property of others.
24. SeeEPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 108-12.

25. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
26. Id. at 1029-30.
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and modification of liability rules,"27 may be fully compensated
by implicit in-kind compensation.28 In general, "restrictions
imposed by... legislation upon the rights of others [may] serve
as compensation for the property taken."29
Such implicit in-kind compensation is constitutionally
sufficient for Epstein when the impact of the regulation is
proportionate; that is, when after imposition of the restrictions,
everyone has the same proportion of the pie as they had before.
For example, bankruptcy legislation is a prima facie taking
because it forces a disposition of contract rights. However,
bankruptcy legislation delivers constitutionally sufficient implicit
in-kind compensation because all creditors of the debtor suffer
the same loss and all share pro rata in the debtor's assets." All
creditors lose, but none of them suffer a disproportionate
impact. Similarly, natural resource conservation measures that
prevent individual exploitation of a common pool, such as a
fishery or a public forest, deliver full implicit in-kind
compensation because the restrictions leave everyone with the
same proportionate share of private property that they had
before the regulations were imposed."
By contrast, rent control schemes are blatantly disproportionate. In essence, rent control legislation results in
government seizure of a leasehold, coupled with a forced option
to renew at a fixed or formula price. The government then
assigns the leasehold to a tenant and delegates to the tenant the
government's duty to compensate the landlord. Of course, the
compensation (in the form of rent) is always below the fair
market value because that is the whole point of rent control.
The effect of the scheme is to give tenants a larger share of the
pie by taking a portion of the pie away from the landlord.
However, what Epstein concedes to regulation, in the form of
implicit in-kind compensation, he takes away when he considers
the limitations on takings imposed by the public use
27. EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 195.
28. See id. at 195-215.
29. Id. at 195 (emphasis removed).
30. This conclusion holds true primarily for unsecured creditors. Secured creditors,
by contrast, are generally left with their collateral security. Their contract rights are not
materially damaged, because they are given the fruits of their contractual foresight in
the form of the collateral security. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-10 (West 1996).
31. Nobody has any property interest in the common resource until it is reduced to
possession. Thus, the restrictions impose no burdens on private property rights.
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requirement. No property may be taken, even with payment of
just compensation, unless the taking is for a public use. Under
current doctrine, the public use requirement is satisfied
whenever the taking is "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose."' 2 Even more broadly, the Court has stated that public
use is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers."ss But as one commentator has pointed out, this
statement is literally incoherent because the police power,
"[1] egitimately exercised.... requires no compensation. Thus, if
public use is truly coterminous with the police power, a state
could
freely
choose
between
compensation
and
34
noncompensation any time its actions served a 'public use.'
Epstein concurs: "the received wisdom, which trivializes the
public use limitation, is incorrect. ... To allow... indirect
public benefit to satisfy the requirement for a public use is to
make the requirement wholly empty."s This view is supported
by the Supreme Court's conclusion that Hawaii had met the
public use requirement through legislation that, in effect,
compelled landlords to sell their property to their tenants. 6
Epstein argues that the public use requirement should be
considered satisfied only when the government condemns
property to provide a "public good" in the economic sense. 7
Public goods, so conceived, possess several characteristics: no
one may be excluded from using a public good, one person's
consumption of a public good will not impair others'
consumption, and the marginal cost of provision of a public
good is practically zero. National defense is the paradigmatic
example, but there are few other examples of such pure public
32. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
33. Id. at 240.
34. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 70
(1986).
35. EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 162, 170.
36. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 233-34, 241-42. Academic commentary is
typically in agreement with the Court. See BRUcE A. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 190 n.5 (1977) ("[Tlhe modem understanding of 'public use'
holds that any state purpose otherwise constitutional should qualify as sufficiently
'public' to justify a taking ....
"). Some commentators take a more thoughtful approach.
See generally Merrill, supra note 34. Merrill argues that courts should use the public use
requirement to scrutinize the means by which property is taken. In Merrill's view, public
use is not satisfied when a private faction has captured the legislative process to take
property for private gain (see, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
410 Mich. 616 (1981)), or when the government acts because transaction costs are so
high that they frustrate voluntary market transactions.
37. See EPSTEIN, supranote 1, at 166-68.
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goods.
Epstein applies his theory to progressive taxation by
concluding initially that taxation is a prima facie taking. He then
considers whether progressive income or estate taxation delivers
implicit in-kind compensation and satisfies his conception of the
public use requirement.- Even assuming that the receipts from
income and estate taxation are used entirely to deliver public
goods (thus satisfying the public use requirement), Epstein
concludes that the imposition of progressively higher tax rates
falls to produce implicit in-kind compensation. Recall that
Epstein's test for implicit in-kind compensation is whether the
government action produces a "roportionateimpact on those
affected. If the regulation instead has a disproportionate impact,
that is, it changes the size of the pizza slices rather than just the
size of the pizza, it falls to deliver implicit in-kind compensation.
And, of course, progressive rate taxation has precisely this
disproportionate effect. The intended purpose of progressive
taxation is to affect taxpayers in a disproportionate fashion. It is
easy to see why it takes Epstein only five pages to apply his
theory to progressive taxation; the conclusion flows ineluctably
from all that has gone before.
Esptein's theory is a powerful and elegant logical exposition
of the limits on the power of governments to seize property,
whether explicitly or through the protective cover of
regulations. But it is only theory, and the Supreme Court shows
few signs of embracing it wholesale. It is time then to ask
whether Epstein's theory can be translated into the language of
current doctrine.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS ON PROGRESSIVE TAXATION

None of the instances in which the Supreme Court has ruled
upon constitutional objections to income or estate taxation,
with or without progressive rates, has resulted in any opinion
concerning the extent to which the Takings Clause might
inhibit taxation. Indeed, the precise question-does the Takings
Clause bar progressive rate taxation?-has never been presented
to the Court. Some might argue that the failure to make the
inquiry stems from near-universal acceptance of the validity of
the progressive tax. Perhaps, but meek acquiescence on the part
38. See id. at 2885, 295-305.
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of the people does not operate as some sort of constitutional
doctrine of prescription. The question is open; the Court is free
to decide the issue.
The United States first imposed an income tax during the
Civil War as an emergency war measure.-9 Annual income
between $600 and $5,000 was taxed at 5%; income between
$5,000 and $10,000 was taxed at 7.5%; income over $10,000 was
taxed at 10%.4 A year later the rates were made steeper. The
intermediate rate was eliminated and all income above $5,000
was taxed at 10%.41 Shortly after the end of the war, the
graduated rates were repealed. However, a uniform rate income
tax persisted until 1872.4
The constitutional validity of this progressive tax was attacked
in Springer v. United States" as an unapportioned direct tax in
violation of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which
requires that "direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States... according to their respective Numbers."" The
Supreme Court rejected this challenge, relying upon historical
evidence of the Framers' intent and dicta in Hylton v. United
States,45 a 1796 decision which held that a tax on carriages was
not a direct tax requiring apportionment. Justice Noah Swayne,
writing for the Court in Springer,concluded that direct taxes "are
only capitation taxes... and taxes on real estate."46 In
upholding the progressive income tax of 1865, the Court never
intimated any opinion about the validity of the tax's progressive
rate, nor did the appellant raise the issue.
Springerwas not the Court's first encounter with the validity of
income taxation. In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule7 the Court
upheld a portion of the Civil War income tax that taxed the
income of insurance companies at a single rate.4 The insurance
company attacked the government's construction of the statute
and also contended that the tax was an invalid direct tax. As in
39. SeeAct ofJune 30,1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281 (1864) (amended 1865).
40. See id.
41. SeeAct of March 3,1865, ch. 78,13 Stat. 469, 479 (1865) (repealed 1867).
42. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 2, at 427.
43. 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3.

45. 3U.S. 171 (1796).
46. Springer,102 U.S. at 602.
47. 74 U.S. 433 (1869).
48. SeeAct ofJune 30,1864, §§ 105,120, 13 Stat. 223, 276, 283-84 (1864).
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Springer,Justice Swayne delivered the Court's opinion. Relying
almost entirely on statements by individual justices in Hylton,
Justice Swayne concluded that the tax was indirect. No challenge
was raised to the rate structure of the tax.
In Scholey v. Rew,49 through the pen ofJustice Nathan Clifford,
the Court ruled that a "succession tax" on real property was not
an unapportioned direct tax, but was instead an "excise tax or
duty."' This was a curious explanation because just six years
earlier the Court itself had defined an excise tax as either a
consumption or sales tax.51 It is true that in that earlier case,
PacificInsuranceCo., the Court had intimated that a "duty" might
be more than a customs impost, in that it might include all
"things due and recoverable by law"-a meaning "hardly less
comprehensive than 'taxes.' 5 But if duties and taxes were
fungible, it was an unconscionable oversight for the Court to
decide, as it then did in Scholey v. Rew, that because a "tax" was
really a "duty" there was no need to decide whether or not the
tax was direct. The reasoning in Scholey readily illustrates why
Professor David Currie selected Justice Clifford as the all-time
leader among Justices of the Court in "Inanities Per Page." 3
History has been spared Justice Clifford's views on the validity of
progressive rates; the plaintiff in Scholey did not challenge the
rate structure of the tax.
The Court's next foray into the constitutional validity of
income taxation produced Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,"
the famous case that invalidated the income tax as a direct tax,
thereby prompting the Sixteenth Amendment. The tax at issue
in Pollock, enacted in 1894, taxed all income at one rate (two
percent) but exempted the first $4,000 of income. Although the
tax was not progressive in its marginal rate structure, the
relatively high exemption made it progressive in its effective
49. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1875).
50. Id. at 346.
51. SeePacificIns. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. at 445.
52. Id.
53. David P. Currie, The Most InsignificantJustice:A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. CHi. L.
REv. 466,473-77 (1983).
54. 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh) 158 U.S. 601 (1895). In the first opinion, the Court
invalidated the tax as applied to income from real property and from state bonds. As for

the other issues, the eight Justices who heard the argument were equally divided and
therefore no decision was reached. Id. at 586. Upon rehearing, with Justice Jackson
bringing the Court to a full complement of nine, the Court voted 5-4 to strike down the
remaining aspects of the income tax as an invalid direct tax.
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rates. 5 Despite its prior rulings in Pacific Insurance Co. and
Springer, the Court held that the tax was constitutionally
defective because it was an apportioned direct tax. The Court
did not base its decision on the progressivity of the tax.
Although the taxpayer argued that the tax violated due process
because its exemption of the first $4,000 of income was
arbitrary, the Court did not decide that issue." Only Justice
Field, in his concurrence, took a stance against the
constitutional status of the progressive tax:
The income tax.... discriminates between those who
receive an income of four thousand dollars and those who do
not.... [T] his arbitrary discrimination .... is class legislation
[and

thus violative

of due process] ....

Whenever

a

distinction is made in the burdens the law imposes... by
reason of... birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class
legislation .... [This tax] is the same in essential character as
that of the English income tax statute of 1691, which taxed
Protestants at a certain rate, Catholics, as a class, at double
the rate of Protestants, and Jews at another and separate
rate.57
In the interim between Pollock and the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the Court decided two cases
involving the validity of progressive rate inheritance taxes. In
both cases, the progressive rate structure was attacked as
unconstitutional. In neither case, however, was that challenge
based on the Takings Clause. In the first case, Magoun v. Illinois
Trust & Savings Banks the plaintiff claimed that a progressive
rate state inheritance tax violated equal protection. In the other,
Knowlton v. Moore,59 a taxpayer asserted that the graduated rates
in a federal inheritance tax violated substantive due process, and
challenged the federal inheritance tax as an unapportioned

55. To see the difference, compare two taxpayers-one with a $50,000 income, and
one with $5,000 in income. The $50,000 income taxpayer would pay a tax of $920, 2% of
$46,000 income, or an effective rate of 1.84% of the taxpayer's total income of $50,000.
The $5,000 taxpayer would pay a tax of $20, 2% of$1,000 income, or an effective rate of
0.4%. Both taxpayers would pay the same marginalrate of 2%. If those differences do not
seem very significant, just multiply the flat rate by 10, making it a 20% rate. The $50,000
taxpayer would then pay $9,200, or an effective rate of 18.4%; the $5,000 taxpayer would
pay $200, or an effective rate of 4%. See supratext accompanying notes 6-9.
56. See Pollock, 157 U.S. at 449 (argument of W.D. Guthrie, attorney for plaintiffappellant).
57. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 596 (Field,J., concurring).
58. 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
59. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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direct tax.
Magoun involved an Illinois inheritance tax that imposed a
1% tax on all property inherited by a decedent's close relatives
and a 2% tax on all property inherited by more distant relatives.
All other testamentary bequests were taxed at a series of rates
ranging from 3% to 6%. The plaintiff alleged that the rates
constituted a denial of equal protection. Over a lone dissent by
Justice Brewer, the Court upheld the tax. Justice McKenna,
newly appointed to Justice Field's former seat, delivered the
Court's opinion. He concluded that the tax was not upon
property, but upon the "right to take property by devise or
descent," a right which "is the creature of the law, and not a
natural right-a privilege, and therefore the authority which
confers it may impose conditions upon it."60
In our time, when almost everyone sneers at the distinction
between rights and governmentally conferred privileges, 6' many
would question Justice McKenna's zealous embrace of this
simple positivism. In any case, the Court found no violation of
equal protection. Even though the tax operated unequally, "the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to compel the State
to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation."62 So long as exemptions
and varying rates "proceed within reasonable limits and general
usage, [they] are within the discretion of the state legislature. ''s
The Court intimated that this reasoning would not have
controlled if the tax had been applied to property. However,
because "[t]he tax is not on money, [but rather] it is on the
right to inherit," the Court found no barriers to its imposition in
due process or equal protection. 4
Justice Brewer, who dissented, read the Court's opinion the
same way. He stated that, "[i] t seems to be conceded that if this
were a tax upon property [the graduated rates] could not be
sustained. ' Justice Brewer objected because he regarded the
graduated rates as "purely arbitrary... wealth [classifications]60. Magoun, 170 U.S. at 288.
61. See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1988); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw,81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
62. Magoun, 170 U.S. at 295.
63. Id. (quoting Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania,134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890)).
64. Id. at 300.

65. Id. at 302 (BrewerJ, dissenting).
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a tax directly and intentionally made unequal."6
The plaintiff in Knowlto 6 7 challenged a federal inheritance
tax that imposed graduated rates on inheritances over $10,000.
The Court readily concluded that Congress had the power to
tax the right of inheritance. After a lengthy discourse on the
construction of the statute, Justice White, writing for the Court,
relied upon Scholey to dismiss the argument that the tax was a
direct unapportioned tax. Justice White improved upon Justice
Clifford's explanation of why the tax was not direct. Justice
White stated that the tax was not on property at all, but rather
upon the right to inherit property.6 However misplaced this
positivistic faith may have been, it was consistent with the
Court's prior ruling in Magoun.
Most of Justice White's opinion in Knowlton was devoted to
refuting the taxpayer's contention that the progressive rates
violated the Uniformity Clause, which requires that "all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." 69 Because the tax was not a direct tax, but a "duty or
excise," the Court was required to address the point. However,
the Court concluded that the Uniformity Clause compelled only
geographic uniformity. Finally, Justice White rejected the
taxpayer's contention that progressive rates were
so repugnant to fundamental principles of equality and
justice that the law should be held to be void, even though it
transgresses no express limitation in the Constitution.... In
the absence of constitutional limitation, the [propriety of
progressive rate taxation] ...
judicial [matter] .70

is [a] legislative and not [a]

Nevertheless, Justice White hinted that extra-constitutional
limits might apply to invalidate taxes, progressive or otherwise.
He stated that
[i]f a case should ever arise, where an arbitrary and
confiscatory exaction is imposed bearing the guise of a
progressive or any other form of tax, it will be time enough to
consider whether the judicial power can afford a remedy by
applying inherent and fundamental principles for the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 303.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
Id. at81.
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, c. 1.
Knowfton, 178 U.S. at 109.
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protection of the individual, even though there be no express

authority in the Constitution to do so. 71
Although the Court was willing to entertain the idea of
unenumerated rights, albeit dismissing their application in this
case, it gave no consideration whatsoever to the explicit
constitutional limitations of the Takings Clause.
Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment enabled Congress
to enact an income tax without apportioning it by population.
Pollock had ruled that, although income taxes were indirect,
taxes on income derived from property (such as rents,
dividends, and interest) were direct taxes on property, and thus
invalid unless apportioned among the States. Because the object
of the late nineteenth century income tax was to tax the fruits of
capital, this holding made the income tax useless. No one
wanted to tax wages, salaries, or professional incomes alone.
Therefore, if income derived from capital could only be taxed
on an apportioned basis, the income tax could easily be evaded
by a wholesale relocation of capital-derived income to less
populous States. The Sixteenth Amendment removed the
apportionment obstacle. Less than six months after its
ratification, Congress enacted a comprehensive tax, which was
retroactive to the effective date of the Amendment. 72
The validity of the new tax was promptly placed at issue in
Brushaberv. Union PacificRI. Co.73 Edward White, by then Chief
Justice, once again wrote for the Court. The bulk of Chief
Justice White's opinion was devoted to refuting the plaintiff's
contention that the tax exceeded congressional powers. The
Sixteenth Amendment did not enlarge Congress' power to
impose an income tax; it simply relieved Congress of the
obligation to impose an income tax in a particular mode, that is,
apportioned among the States by population.
The plaintiff also attacked the progressive rates as violative of
substantive due process. Chief Justice White responded that it
was "well settled" that the Due Process Clause "is not a limitation
upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution; in other words, that the Constitution does not
conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing
71. Id. at 109-10.
72. This tax was officially named the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat.
114, 166-81 (1913).
73. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
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power and taking the same power away, on the other, by the
limitations of the due process clause." 74
In his next sentence, however, ChiefJustice White "conceded"
that the Fifth Amendment controlled Congress's taxing power.
The Fifth Amendment would invalidate
a seeming exercise of the taxing power, [if] the act
complained of was so arbitrary as to [be] ... not the exertion

of taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking...
in violation of the Fifth Amendment; or, what is equivalent
thereto, [if it] was so wanting in basis for classification as to
produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably
lead to the same conclusion.
Chief Justice White, borrowing the circular logic of Justice
Clifford, argued that the Due Process Clause did not limit the
taxing power except when it limited the taxing power.
Regardless, the explicit limits of the Takings Clause were never
mentioned or considered by the Court.76
ChiefJustice White, in Brushaberas in Knowlton, regarded the
due process challenge to progressive rates as rooted in a
constitutionally unenumerated right He stated:
[I] t is elaborately insisted that although there be no express
constitutional provision prohibiting it, the progressive feature
of the tax causes it to transcend the conception of all taxation
and to be a mere arbitrary abuse of power which must be
treated as wanting in due process."
Chief Justice White remarked that this argument was
"necessarily foreclosed by the ruling" in Knowlton.78 Upon
reexamination of Knowlton, this comment seems only to signify
that the graduated rates at issue under the 1913 income tax
were neither sufficiently arbitrary nor sufficiently confiscatory to
merit the invocation of unenumerated rights.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 24-25.
76. The lawyers for the taxpayer did argue that the statutory obligation to withhold
sufficient interest to meet the recipient's tax liability was a taking because it compelled
the interest payer to perform uncompensated "compulsory service." See id. at 3
(argument of Julien T. Davies). The Court made short work of this rather fanciful
suggestion. See id. at 21, 24. The more direct takings argument-that graduated rate
taxation of income constitutes a taking of the marginal increments of income paid to
extinguish the tax liability resulting from application of graduated rates-was never
made by counsel nor considered by the Court. The graduated rates were challenged
only insofar as they might deny substantive due process.
77. Id. at 25.
78. Id.
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Since Brushaber, the Court has not reconsidered the
constitutional validity of progressive rate taxation. The Court
has upheld progressive rate taxation of estates on the dubious
theory that the right to inherit is a privilege granted by an
omnipotent sovereign, a privilege that can be conditioned at the
sovereign's discretion. The Court has also upheld progressive
rate income taxation against a substantive due process
challenge. The Court held, in essence, that the progressive tax
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The limits
imposed by the Takings Clause on progressive rate taxation
remain territory totally unexplored by the Court.
III. THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN TAXATION AND TAKING

Does the Takings Clause at all limit the government's taxation
power? Relying on dicta to decide, in PacificInsurance Co., 9 that
an income tax on insurance companies was a valid indirect tax,
Justice Noah Swayne delivered some dicta of his own:
Where the power of taxation, exercised by Congress, is
warranted by the Constitution, as to mode and subject, it is,
necessarily, unlimited in its nature. Congress may prescribe
the basis, fix the rates, and require payment as it may deem
proper. Within the limits of the Constitution it is supreme in
its action....

The taxing power is given in the most comprehensive
terms. The only limitations imposed are: that direct taxes,
including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned; that duties,
imposts, and excises shall be uniform; and that no duties shall
be imposed upon articles exported from any State. With these
exceptions, the exercise of the power is, in all respects,
unfettered8

Those who are fond of clinging to obiter dictum' may seize
upon Justice Swayne's pronouncement as an indication of the
Supreme Court's view that the Takings Clause imposes no limits
on taxation. By parity of reasoning, however, one might
successfully contend that the Equal Protection Clause has no

79. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433 (1869).
80. Id. at 443-46.
81. Latin for jurisprudential flotsam and jetsam. Both are primarily useful as a last
resort.
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effect on taxation and, therefore, that a tax imposed on the
basis of race alone would be impervious to assault.
Justice Swayne, of course, rivalled Justice Clifford in his lack of
ability. David Currie, a fastidious student of the Court,
'2
characterizes Justice Swayne's opinions as "below standard."
Peter Magrath, in his biography of ChiefJustice Morrison Waite,
asserts that Justice Swayne was President Lincoln's weakest
appointment to the bench.8 Charles Fairman, in his biography
of Justice Samuel Miller, who was Justice Swayne's colleague,
stated that Wallace, the Court's Reporter, thought the Court
would be better off withoutJustice Swayne.84 On balance, we can
safely dismiss the probative force of Justice Swayne's hastily
disgorged pearl of wisdom. In any case, Justice Swayne's dictum
at least admits there are some constitutional limits on taxation,
albeit only limits pertaining to the mode or subject of taxation.
Taxation and takings are inherently in tension with each
other. Without looking at independent constitutional limits, the
scope of the government's power to tax seems virtually
boundless. However, the Takings Clause, like the Free Speech
and Equal Protection Clauses, is an independent constitutional
limit on the taxing power. As previously pointed out, no one
would argue that the Equal Protection Clause would permit an
income tax system that imposed differential rates based on the
race of the taxpayerH Similarly, no one would contend that the
Free Speech Clause would allow an income tax system that
imposed higher tax rates on income derived from the
authorship of political books as compared to rates imposed on
income from other sources.86

82. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST

HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 452 (1985).
83. See C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER
101 (1963).
84. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 18621890, at 382 (1939). In fairness to Justice Swayne, Wallace was of the opinion that
Nathan Clifford wvas even worse. "Was there ever "such a man ... in such a place?"
wondered Wallace. Id. David Currie rates Clifford a top contender for the dubious
distinction of "Most InsignificantJustice." See Currie, supranote 53, at 473-77.
85. Of course, in the case of a federal income tax, it is the "equal protection"
component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause that applies. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The content is the same, however. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst,
The Fiflh Amendment's GuaranteeofEqualProtection,55 N.C. L. Rev. 541 (1977).
86. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991); Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star &
Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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Likewise, the Takings Clause necessarily limits the taxing
power. After all, taxation is, by definition, a taking. Surely the
government takes your property if government officers enter
your home and haul off your piano. How then is it not a taking
if, instead, the government imposes a tax liability on you that
you can only extinguish by surrendering your piano? The
problem remains the same when we shift the analysis from
tangible to intangible property. Surely the government takes
your property if it simply seizes your bank account. How then is
it not a taking if the government instead imposes a tax liability
on you that you can only extinguish by surrendering a large
portion of your bank account?
It is simply too facile to respond that, because the federal
government has explicit power to tax, taxation is exempt from
the otherwise applicable limits on governmental action.
According to this argument, the Takings Clause is applicable
only to those takings that occur outside the realm of taxation.
Proponents of this view reason that, because taxation necessarily
involves the taking of property and the government was given
the power to tax, the Takings Clause must be read as limiting
only governmental takings of property by means other than
taxation.
This argument cannot stand because it fails to account for the
central purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to avoid
imposing the full cost of public benefits on a few people.8 7 The
purpose behind the Takings Clause is to prevent the forcible
redistribution of private property for public benefit (unless the
owners are compensated).8 Surely an income tax of 100%
imposed on a single individual-for example, Bill Gates-would
violate the Takings Clause. If that is so, then the problem
becomes a matter of degree. Is a 100% income tax that applies
87. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the
Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole").
88. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & MARK
V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1565 (2d ed. 1991).
[T]he evil at which the eminent domain clause is aimed.., involves at least
some sorts of redistribution of resources. The clause reflects ajudgment that if
government is seeking to produce some public benefit... the payment [must)
come from the public at large-taxpayers--rather than from identifiable
individuals.

No. 1]

Takings and ProgressiveRate Taxation

only to the ten highest income earners in the nation any better?
If not, then why does the problem disappear when the 100%
income tax applies to the 2.5 million highest income earners in
the nation?8 9
According to Justice Swayne's ill-considered dictum, 90 the
Constitution at the very least controls the mode by which taxes
are levied. The.mode of taxation must be examined in order to
analyze the intersection between takings and taxation, because
the mode implicates both the concerns of the Takings Clause
and the boundaries of the taxing power. As two commentators
have noted, "progression cannot be defined meaningfully
without reference to its redistributive effect on wealth or
income."9' Moreover, many of the justifications offered for
progressive taxation reflect an uneasiness about the validity of
the mode of graduated rates.
As early as 1885, Justice Horace Gray acknowledged the
existence of tension between taxation and the Takings Clause.
In Cole v. La Grange,92 Justice Gray opined that taxation "requires
no other compensation than the taxpayer receives in being
protected by the government to the support of which he
contributes."93 In this statement he made both a frank
concession that taxation must be reconciled with the Takings
Clause and a promising start toward that end. Justice Gray was
undoubtedly correct in asking whether the taking produced by
taxation is fully compensated by the provision of public benefits
through general expenditures, but he may have been too
sanguine about the certainty of this compensation.
The benefit principle invoked by Justice Gray posits that the
benefits purchased by t x revenues are roughly equivalent to the
tax liability.94 At a minimum, benefit theory requires that

89. See, e.g., WALTERJ. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE ANATOMY OF JUSTICE IN
TAXATION 9 (1973) ("Since the essence of taxation lies in coercive takings by
government, there is always the question of how the act of taxing has affected the
distribution of property or income among citizens."). But if the tax as applied to a single
individual is no taking, there is no problem if applied to large numbers. See text
accompanying note 122 infra.
90. See supratext accompanying footnotes 79-84.
91. Blum &Kalven, supranote 2, at 486.
92. 113 U.S. 1 (1885).
93. Id. at 7-8; see also Richard A. Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain
Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 351,372-73.
94. For a general exposition of benefit theory, see, for example, EDWIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 150-229 (2d ed. 1908).
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benefits increase as income increases. This is a formidable and
uncertain task. The distribution of governmental benefits
cannot easily be traced with any degree of accuracy. Perhaps all
that need be shown is a rough correlation between benefits and
income. Even so, a successful defense of progressive tax rates
must demonstrate that as a taxpayer's income increases, the
taxpayer receives an ever-increasingproportion of the public benefits
purchased with tax revenues. If this correlation cannot be
proven, all that can be established is that the amount of public
benefits received is roughly proportional to income. While this
may be adequate to defend a proportional tax, such as the socalled "fiat tax" which taxes all income at a uniform rate, it is no
defense for progressive rate taxation.
The two standard benefit theory arguments fail to establish
that the share of public benefits received increases with income.
First, the "property benefits" argument proposes that while
personal benefits may be roughly equal for everyone, public
benefits to property increase with the amount of property
owned.95 Second, the "income-equals-benefit" approach holds
that income or wealth is the common measure of the personal
well-being protected by government; thus benefits received are
axiomatically proportional to income.96 While each of these
theories may suffice to justify single-rate proportional taxation,
both fall tojustify progressive rate taxation.
The "property benefits" argument fails because it is simply not
true that public expenditures on property increase with the
amount of property. Public benefits to property inhere in the
protection of property. National defense, internal security (such
as police and fire protection), and the legal system are all public
benefits critical to property protection. But providing these
benefits in sufficient quantity to protect persons will also
necessarily protect property. A national defense that is adequate
to protect Americans from external harm to their persons will
also protect their property at no extra cost. Moreover, the level
of protection necessary to defend tangible property does not
vary proportionally with its value. An architecturally exquisite
small cottage on Telegraph Hill in San Francisco is hideously
expensive, but the cost of providing police and fire protection is

95. See Blum & Kalven, supranote 2, at 452-53.
96. See id. at 453-54.
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no more (and probably less) for the cottage than it is for a rundown large house in a less desirable quarter of the city.
Finally, the cost of protecting intangible assets is a fixed cost,
unrelated to the assets' value. In order to protect intangible
assets such as securities, bank accounts, or private pensions, the
government must provide system protection that does not vary
with the value of the protected assets. For example, the legal
system sufficiently protects bank accounts by punishing people
who steal money. The cost of protecting certain types of
property, such as deposit insurance for savings accounts, may
increase with property value, but the rate of increase is
proportional to the increase in property value, not
disproportionally greater. The "property benefits" argument is a
rather poor justification for single-rate proportional taxation, it
completely fails to justify progressive rate taxation.
The "income-equals-benefit" approach is a tautology. Using
income to measure benefits received provides the perfect
justification for a single-rate proportional tax. It does nothing,
however, to justify progressive rate taxation. Proponents of this
approach usually claim that benefits accrue only to the portion
of income in excess of what is necessary to purchase the bare
necessities of life. 97 This fillip simply justifies Steve Forbes's
version of a single-rate proportional tax-one that applies to all
income above a minimum exempt amount. In order to justify
progressive rates, one must demonstrate that the proportion of
benefits received increases with income. Of course, this theory
cannot prove this contention, because it simply equates income
with benefits received, rather than relying upon some other
measure of benefits.
Benefit theory is adequate to the task for which it was invoked
by Justice Gray-to explain why taxation is not an
uncompensated taking-but it fails to explain why progressive rate
taxation is not an uncompensated taking, because benefit theory
does not prove that the share of benefits received increases with
income. Something else must tried for that task, and "sacrifice
theory" is a classic attempt to do so.
Sacrifice theory "builds on the undeniably true observation
that the payment of taxes represents a coerced contribution to
the government. It... treats taxes as though they were a
97. See id. at 453.
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confiscation of property. The problem then becomes one of
confiscating in an equitable manner."98 Equity "requires
inflicting equal hurt on each taxpayer."' So far, this appears to
be nothing more than another explanation for why a single-rate
proportional tax is not an uncompensated taking. The wrinkle
added by sacrifice theorists is the idea that the sacrifice should
be expressed in terms of the "utility" of money rather than in
terms of the monetary unit itself. According to this theory, the
dollars you pay in taxes do not measure your sacrifice. Rather,
your sacrifice is measured in terms of the "utils" of bliss
surrendered by your tax payment. This, of course, requires
sacrifice theorists to employ some fancy footwork to
demonstrate that the utility of additional income is less for a
high-income earner than it is for a low-income earner. At first,
this seems intuitively obvious-an additional $25,000 of income
would probably be of less value to a person with an income of
$10 million than it would be to a person with an income of
$50,000. By this reasoning, the $10 million income earner
should pay a larger share of his dollar income in taxes than the
$50,000 income earner to produce a proportionately equal
sacrifice of utility. Put another way, if one person's income
equals 1,000 utils and another's income equals only 100 utils,
sacrifice is proportionally equal if each taxpayer surrenders 10%
of his total utility. If the utility value of income declines with
increases in income, progressive tax rates are required to
produce a proportionately equal sacrifice of utility.
Although theoretically neat, a closer look shows that sacrifice
theory turns out to be a flop in practice:
To yield progressive rates of tax... the utility curve for
money has to decline very sharply. Whatever the common
sense of the notion that money has some declining utility, it
can hardly be invoked to support the far more exacting
notion that the order of the decline is very steep."O
Therein lies the problem for sacrifice theorists, for no one has
been able to demonstrate convincingly that the utility curve for
money drops steeply enough to justify progressive tax rates. 1°1
98. Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 455-56 (footnote omitted).
100. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 89, at 18.
101. Se4 e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 2, at 462-65 ("Perhaps the most bizarre
chapter in the intellectual history of progression consists in the many attempts to state
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Accordingly, sacrifice theorists have turned to Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill for the proposition that the proper goal of
taxation is to minimize the total sacrifice of all persons in the
taxed polity. In theory, minimal sacrifice would be achieved if
tax revenue were obtained first from the least valuable dollars
(dollars with a low util value). By this reasoning, high-income
taxpayers should surrender all their marginal income until their
income has been reduced to an average level of utility. This
would spread the total sacrifice more evenly. This process of
extreme income leveling would continue until all public
revenue needs were met. As Walter Blum and Harry Kalven put
it, "[t]his route to progression in taxation is astonishing. Its
logic would dictate 100 percent marginal tax rates and the
successive leveling of incomes after tax." 10 2 Such rates might
even tempt the ghost of ChiefJustice Edward White to conclude
limits on taxation had been
that his extraconstitutional
3
exceeded.11
More to the point, "[t]he radical sweep of the conclusion
dictated by the minimum sacrifice approach-however mild the
slope of the money utility curve-served to call into doubt the
key premise that money really had declining utility."1 4 As it
turns out, it is by no means certain that money has declining
utility. Those who make the claim are far more likely to have an
income of $50,000 than an income of $10 million. Money is
incredibly versatile. It can be used to satisfy any consumption
pleasure, however exotic. Money does not need to be spent to
have utility. It is the vehicle for savings and investmentactivities whose utility may well remain constant and may even
increase with income. Money can also be given away, thus
producing the utility rewards of philanthropy, which may also be
constant or increase with income.
For sacrifice theory to help defend progressive tax rates, it is
necessary to establish that every person has the same utility
curve for money. But even the dimmest observer of humanity
must concede that this is simply not the case. Some people are
satisfied with very little money and make no effort to acquire
the shape of the curve.... All in all the attempts to discover more about the utility curve
than the fact that it declines somewhat are interesting but not persuasive.").
102. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 89, at 19.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
104. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 89, at 19.
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more; others appear to have an insatiable desire for more
money, regardless of how much they already have. Finally,
attitudes toward money are likely to shift over time, even for a
single individual. In the end, sacrifice theory is nothing more
than a hopeless muddle of unprovable theory and a very bad
explanation of human behavior. In short, sacrifice theory offers
no defense against the charge that progressive rate taxation is a
taking.
The remaining justifications for progressive rate taxation are
even less capable of demonstrating that progressive rates are not
a taking. One argument-that taxation should reflect one's
ability to pay-is merely a variation on sacrifice theory. Only by
continuing to cling to the notion that the utility curve of money
is steeply declining can one believe that it is "easier" for rich
people to pay a larger share of their incomes in taxation than
others with more modest incomes. Even less persuasive is the
paternalistic contention that those who have large incomes will
spend their money in a less "socially worthy" fashion than would
either the government or taxpayers with modest incomes. The
argument that governmental expenditures are more socially
worthy is simply an argument for taking a disproportionate
share of large incomes to accomplish public purposes. This is
the very definition of a taking. The argument that modest
income-earners spend their money on more socially worthy
necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter, while rich people
spend their money on frivolities, such as flowers, ski vacations in
Chile, champagne, and caviar, is merely an argument for a tax
exemption for the income necessary to provide for bare
necessities of life. The argument says nothing at all about the
justice of progressive tax rates.
All the justifications that have been offered for progressive
taxation reflect the uneasy relationship between taxation and
takings. Some taxation is necessary and clearly constitutionally
permissible. The problem with progressive taxation lies in the
mode by which the tax is levied. The essential purpose of the
Takings Clause is to prevent the use of public power to force a
minority of people to surrender their property for public
benefit without compensation. Of course, progressive rate
taxation is designed to cause a minority of people, those with
high incomes, to surrender a larger portion of their property
than others for the public benefit. None of this would be
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problematic if it could be demonstrated, even roughly, that the
disproportionate surrender of income was fully compensated in
some way. Benefit theory attempts to do so, but fails. Sacrifice
theory attempts to show that the disproportionate seizure of
income resulting from progressive tax rates is really not
disproportionate. However, this attempt is in vain, because
sacrifice theory relies on an imaginary Benthamite calculation of
utils instead of the cold, hard cash of the real world.
There is simply no escaping the fact that the Takings Clause is
intended to limit the government's power to seize private
property without compensation for the purpose of
redistributing it to others. This is true regardless of how much
public benefit might be produced by the transfer. Likewise,
there is simply no escaping the fact that progressive income
taxation is intended to redistribute income from high-income
taxpayers to those with lower incomes. 01 5 The clash between
progressive taxation and the Takings Clause means that
progressive rates are a taking unless those subject to graduated
rates are fully compensated, or unless all forms and modes of
taxation are exempt from the Takings Clause. As we have seen,
however, the Supreme Court has never recognized such an
exemption.
IV. CURRENT REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE AND
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION

Given the conclusions in the previous section, it is time to
examine the possibility that progressive tax rates result in the
taking of property without just compensation. The Court's
regulatory takings doctrine employs a two-step process
composed of three litmus-test rules and a catch-all balancing
test. Only if the litmus-test rules fail to dispose of the problem is
the general balancing assessment undertaken. Two of the

105. In 1991, incomes comprising the top 1 percent of all incomes paid 24.7% of the
total federal individual income tax; the top 5 percent of incomes paid 43.5% of the total
federal individual income tax; the top 10 percent of incomes paid 55.4% of the tax; the
top 25 percent of incomes paid 77.3% of the total tax; and the top 50 percent of
incomes paid 94.5% of the total federal individual income tax. See HALL & RABUSHKA,
supranote 2, at 45. By contrast, 1991 federal spending on Medicare, Medicaid, welfare
assistance and other social welfare programs amounted to about 52% of all federal
expenditures, and virtually all of those expenditures were delivered to those in the
bottom 50 percent of incomes. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

CENSUS,

1994, at 332 (114th ed. 1994).
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litmus-test rules, permanent dispossession and loss of all
economically viable use, are potentially applicable to progressive
rate taxation. The third litmus-test rule, common law nuisance
abatement, is not.
A. PermanentDispossession
When regulations of property permanently dispossess an
owner of his property, a per se taking has occurred. The per se
rule is usually associated with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.,106 in which the Court held that New York had
effected a taking by authorizing Teleprompter to affix its coaxial
cable to a minute portion of Mrs. Loretto's apartment building,
thereby dispossessing her of a sliver of her property. Two years
earlier, the Court reached the same conclusion with respect to
intangible property-namely, money. In Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,17 the Court held that government
appropriation of the interest income earned on private funds
deposited into court in an interpleader case was a taking. The
State of Florida contended that the deposited fund was "'public
money' because it [was] held temporarily by the court."'' 8 The
Court rejected the argument and held that, "a State, by ipse dixit,
may not transform private property into public property without
compensation .... This is the very kind of thing that the Taking
Clause... was meant to prevent." ' Lest there be any doubt
following Beckwith, the Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.1
made it absolutely clear that the Takings Clause applies to both
tangible and intangible property. In Monsanto, a federal
regulation that required public disclosure of certain of
Monsanto's proprietary trade secrets was held to be a taking of
the company's intangible property.
Because all taxation results in the permanent dispossession of
taxpayers' property, but taxation is presumptively valid, there
remains the problem of defining the frontier between valid
taxation and taxation that constitutes an uncompensated
regulatory taking. The issue is whether the marginal increment
taken by progressive tax rates is an uncompensated taking.
106. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
107. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
108. Id. at 164.

109. Id.
110. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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Generally, taxation is defended against takings analysis by
asserting that taxation "requires no other compensation than
the taxpayer receives in being protected by the government to
the support of which he contributes.""' This is surely an
adequate justification for a single-rate system in which each
taxpayer pays the same proportion of his income in taxes. 1 2 But
it fails to justify a taxation system that takes an ever-increasing
share of a taxpayer's income. The whole point of the takings
guarantee is to insure that private property is not taken to
provide public benefits without delivery ofjust compensation to
the property owner. The protection and benefits afforded by
government ought to be public goods, that is, goods which are
freely consumable by all without diminishing the ability of
others to consume. To the extent that government provides only
public goods, the benefits produced by taxation are shared pro
rata by the polity. It is difficult to reconcile a disproportionate
taxation system with proportionate delivery of public benefits.
Government, however, does much more than provide public
goods. Many of the benefits delivered by government are
designed to be enjoyed by only a select few beneficiaries. Two
examples of such government benefits are farm commodity
subsidies and welfare entitlements. These government expenditures produce public benefits in which all Americans share
indirectly, but the principal beneficiaries are the targeted
recipients. It is even more difficult to defend disproportionate
taxation when such taxes are levied to support government
expenditures on non-public goods expenditures that are
undertaken to benefit specific portions of society. Only by
ignoring the central premise of the Takings Clause and
enthusiastically embracing a taxing power that is not limited by
the Constitution is it possible to pound the square peg of
disproportionate taxation into the round hole of compensatory
benefits. If there is to be any intellectual honesty, the nettlesome
problem of disproportionate taxation as a takings issue cannot
be ignored. "Since the essence of taxation lies in coercive
takings by government, there is always the question of how the
111. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 8 (1885).
112. To the extent that some minimal level of income is exempt from taxation, the
effective rate of taxation is progressive, never quite reaching the stated rate because of the
initial exemption. The technical term for this phenomenon is degression. Of course, all
taxpayers pay the same proportion of their taxable income in taxes.
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act of taxing has affected the distribution of property or income
among citizens.""3 Absent some reasonable demonstration that
the disproportionality of the taxation (or taking) is justified by
disproportionate compensatory benefits, the disproportionate
feature-the graduated tax rates-is an uncompensated taking.
Defenders of progressive rates may well assert that such rates
are valid so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.14 The invocation of minimal scrutiny, a
familiar and well-settled concept that is applied to challenges of
economic regulations under due process or equal protection,
has no place in the law of regulatory takings.", If a per se takings
rule is involved and is dispositive, that ends the matter. If not,
the government is required to establish that the regulation at
issue is substantially related to a legitimate state objective." 6
Analysis of the factors the Court uses to make that assessment is
deferred;" 7 for the moment it is enough to note that regulatory
takings doctrine is stricter than due process or equal protection.
Defenders of progressive taxation would undoubtedly assert
that it makes no sense to apply the permanent dispossession rule
only to the marginal increments of income taken by progressive
taxation, but to concede that taxation generally is valid despite
the permanent dispossession rule. The reason to do so is
inherent in the central problem of regulatory takings. In trying
to decide when "regulation goes too far... [and] will be
recognized as a taking,""' the Court essentially struggles with the
degree of deference to give to legislative judgments. In the case
of permanent dispossession or regulations that strip owners of
all economically viable use of their property," 9 the Court is
113. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 89, at 9.
114. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843-48 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that minimal scrutiny applies to regulations
challenged as a taking). The Court specifically rejected Brennan's argument. See Nollan,
483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
115. See id. at 834 n.3 ("[I]n the takings field ....[w]e have required that the
regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be
achieved. ...not that 'the State "could rationallyhave decided' that the measure adopted
might achieve the State's objective.'").
116. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980); see alsoPenn Central Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (use
restrictions on real property are takings if not "reasonably necessary to the effectuation
of a substantial government purpose").
117. See infra text accompanying notes 141-49.
118. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
119. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Agins,
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satisfied that no discretion should be accorded the legislature.
By contrast, the Court allows legislatures virtually unlimited
discretion to adopt regulations to abate public or private
nuisances that are actionable at common law.12 When the three
litmus-test rules do not apply, the Court finds regulations valid if
they substantially advance the government's actual and legitimate
objective.12 1 When the problem is the unique one of deciding
what permanent dispossession produced by taxation is
permissible and what is not, the Court necessarily must decide
how much discretion Congress or state legislatures may have in
imposing unequal, disproportionate permanent dispossession.
From one perspective, the case is simple. The marginal
income increment taken by graduated rates is a unique
dispossession, experienced by only those taxpayers with
sufficient income to trigger any graduated rate. Comparing
Loretto to the issue of progressive taxation illustrates this point.
When New York authorized cable television operators to
dispossess owners of apartment buildings of a sufficient portion
of their property to affix coaxial transmission cables, it imposed
a unique dispossession on a potentially numerous class of
people. It did not matter that the minute amount of property
dispossessed may have had very little utility to the owner. Apart
from the Takings Clause and other independent constitutional
limits, New York surely had plenary authority to permit cable
television operators to install their cables for the public benefit.
When Congress enacted progressive rate income taxation, it
dispossessed owners of modest to large incomes of a
disproportionate share of their income (consisting of the sum of
the marginal increments of tax above that produced by the
lowest tax rate), a unique dispossession imposed on a numerous
but identifiable class of people. It should not matter that the
incremental income taken may have great or little utility to its
owner. Apart from the Takings Clause and other independent
constitutional limits, Congress surely had plenary authority to
impose an income tax in whatever form it desired.
From a second perspective, the case is equally simple.
Taxation is simply exempt from the Takings Clause. Congress

447 U.S. at 260-61.
120. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1017-20.
121. SeeNollar 483 U.S. at 834n.3.
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and state legislatures have complete discretion to impose
income taxes at whatever rates they regard as appropriate. In
essence, the claim is that minimal scrutiny, at most, applies to
the question of whether graduated rates are a taking. But this
second position has many flaws. The view that taxation is
exempt from the Takings Clause has never been adopted by the
Court in the face of a takings challenge, perhaps because it is
inconsistent with the core conception of the Takings Clause,
ignores the fact that the Constitution does impose limits on the
mode of taxation, and is at odds with the Court's repeated
statement that the Takings Clause imposes sharper limits on
government regulation than those imposed by the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses.
In truth, the problem is not susceptible to a simple resolution.
Surely legislatures are entitled to considerable discretion in
deciding how to tax incomes to provide public benefits. But if
Congress or a state legislature selects a mode that cuts right to
the heart of the Takings Clause, the courts must either curtail
legislative discretion or abandon the Takings Clause. The Court
has signalled clearly its unwillingness to consign regulatory
takings to the same dustbin in which it has tossed due process
and equal protection scrutiny of economic regulations. Thus the
remaining option is to adopt a constitutional rule of
proportional taxation, a single flat rate on all taxable income,
which would leave legislatures with wide discretion while
preserving the core values of the Takings Clause.
A constitutional requirement that income may be taxed only
at a uniform rate would permit legislatures to decide whether to
exempt any income from taxation and, if so, how much of an
exemption to provide. A legislature bent on taxing primarily the
incomes of the rich could conceivably set an exemption equal to
the median income of the United States'2 or even somewhat
higher, and impose a high rate (perhaps 50%) on all income
earned above the amount exempted. The result would be a
sharply progressive effective rate, approaching, but never quite
equalling, 50% for very high-income taxpayers. Moreover,
legislatures would retain discretion to select the rate at which
incomes are to be taxed. If taxation of only the very rich did not
122. In 1992, the median was $31,553 for all households. This figure is estimated in
1993 dollars. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1995, at 469 (115th ed. 1995).

No. 1]

Takings and ProgressiveRate Taxation

provide sufficient revenue to fuel desired government
programs, then legislatures would be free to tinker with either
the exemption or the rate, or both, in order to produce the
optimal mix. The revenue-neutral flat tax proposed by Robert
Hall and Alvin Rabushka, for example, incorporates a modest
personal exemption and a rate of 19% on all individual
compensation income; business income would be defined in a
more encompassing fashion, but would also be subject to the
19% rate.12 Presidential candidate Steve Forbes proposed a rate
of 17%.4 Senator Phil Gramm urged 16%.12" The important

point is that the merits of any proposed flat tax are for Congress
to decide. What Congress ought not be permitted to decide, if
the Constitution is to be taken seriously, is whether it wishes to
impose differential tax rates simply to dispossess some people of
a disproportionately greater share of their income. A flat tax
would simultaneously preserve legislative discretion and the
raison d'etre of the Takings Clause, and would also be simple to
administer judicially. There would be no spate of follow-on cases
challenging the validity of exemptions or definitions of taxable
income.
B. No Economically Viable Use
If a regulation of property leaves the owner with no
economically viable use, it is a taking."" The rule has been
developed with respect to real property, and its principal
application is to land-use regulations. Nevertheless, given the
Court's conclusion that intangible property is equally entitled to
the protection of the Takings Clause," it is surely the case that
some governmental regulations of intangible property would
deprive the owner of all economically viable use. A requirement
that all of an individual's annual income in excess of $100,000
be donated to charity would deprive the individual owner of all
economically viable use of the income in excess of $100,000. Is
the case any different if the requirement imposed is that the
individual surrender a disproportionate share of the income in
123. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supranote 2, at 55-58.
124. SeeSloan, supranote 8.
125. SeeJonathan Peterson & Ronald Brownstein, GOP Panel CaUsfor Switch to Flat-Tax
System, LOSANGELESTIMEs,Jan. 18, 1996, atAl.
126. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
127. SeeRuckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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the form of taxation? The portion of the affected individual's
intangible property for which he is denied economic use is
smaller, but otherwise the cases are identical.
The problem created by looking at disproportionate taxation
as a destruction of all economically viable use of the marginal
incremental share of income taken in taxation is that there is no
certainty that the marginal increment taken in taxation is a
separate strand of property for takings purposes.' In Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,'2 the Court upheld a
Pennsylvania law that required underground coal miners to
leave sufficient coal in place to support the surface. The Court
ruled that the twenty-seven million tons of coal that
Pennsylvania forced miners to leave in place to support the
surface did "not constitute a separate segment of property for
[federal] takings law purposes."'' 0 This ruling was issued despite
the fact that Pennsylvania law considered underground support
of the surface a separate legal estate. Because the coal left in
place was only a small fraction of the total amount of coal that
could be removed, the miners had "not come close to...
proving that they have
been denied the economically viable use
3
of [their] property.' '
The Court made its most recent pronouncement regarding
the problem of conceptual severance in Lucas v. South Carolina
CoastalComm'n,'32 where the Court admitted that the
'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule... does not
make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of
value is to be measured.... The answer to this difficult
question may lie in... whether and to what degree the
State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to
the particular [property] interest... with respect to which
the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination
of) value.
In Lucas, the takings claimant had asserted a total loss of
economic use in two fee simple titles, and the South Carolina
128. Of course, there is also the threshold issue of whether taxation is a taking and, if
so, under what circumstances. That issue has been dealt with and is assumed for
purposes of this subsection. See supratext accompanying notes 79-105.
129. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
130. Id. at 498.
131. Id. at 499.
132. 505 U.S. at 1003.
133. Id. at 1016 n.7.
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trial court had determined that South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act had "left each of Lucas's beachfront lots
without economic value. ' 'ls4
Similarly, in looking at the problem of progressive taxation, it
is clear that the taxpayer has lost all economic use of that
disproportionate share of income taken by the application of
graduated tax rates. Is this property "accorded legal recognition
and protection ' ' as a separate estate or interest? Money can
surely be spent separately. Its function as a medium of exchange
is its major virtue and reason for existence. The criminal law
treats the theft of money as a taking of a distinct item of
property, and uses the value of stolen property
as a way to
1 6
distinguish minor and major property crimes. 3
On the other hand, although Pennsylvania law regarded the
support estate as a separate estate in land, the Court in Keystone
rejected the idea that the coal required to be left in place
should be considered separate and independent property whose
economic value was taken by' Pennsylvania's "leave-in-place"
regulation. Following Keystone, a proponent of progressive
taxation might more easily assert that the relevant property
whose use has been interfered with is the taxpayer's income as a
whole. From that perspective, progressive tax rates hardly strip
the taxpayer of all economic use of his income.5 7
Keystone may have rejected the notion of conceptual
severance, but Lucas has now opened the door for further
consideration of the idea. In that respect, the Court may merely
be taking its cue from the Court of Federal Claims, which
through the Tucker Act has jurisdiction over damage claims
against the federal government based on the Constitution,
184. Id.
185. Id.
136. See, for example, § 223.1(2) of the Model Penal Code (Official Draft, 1985),
which classifies theft of property of $500 or more as a third degree felony, theft of
property valued between $50 and $500 as a misdemeanor, and thefts of less than $50 as a
petty misdemeanor.
137. Note that this argument implicitly admits that a tax rate of 100% on all income
would deprive affected taxpayers of all economic use of their property. If so, then
proponents of the argument are required to explain why a 99% tax rate does not do the
same thing, and are also in the embarrassing position of having conceded that the
Takings Clause applies to taxation. Of course, die-hard defenders of disproportionate
taxation are probably not about to concede that the taxing power is bounded by the
Takings Clause. It would be politically incorrect to do so.
188. Tucker Act of March 8, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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federal laws or regulations, and contracts. The Court of Federal
Claims has, in recent years, warmly accepted claims of
conceptual severance." 9 Perhaps Lucas is merely an augury of
the Court's more general acceptance of conceptual severance.
In any case, state courts have considerably greater freedom to
interpret their own constitutional Takings Clauses and to apply
conceptual severance.14 In States that impose graduated income
taxes, the highest courts are free to parse their own
constitutional law so as to apply conceptual severance to
graduated income taxes.
C. The Balancing Test
The consequence of rejecting conceptual severance in any
particular case is that the balancing test is brought to bear. A
regulation that substantially advances a legitimate state objective
is not a taking. In assessing whether such advancement exists,
courts examine a number of factors.
If the public benefits produced by the regulation are less than
the private costs imposed, the regulation is unlikely to
"substantially advance" the government's objective. But even if
the public benefits created are greater than the private costs
imposed, there is no automatic assurance that the regulation is
not a taking. The relationship of public benefits to private costs
is more relevant to the independent questions of whether the
public use element has been satisfied and whether the property
owner has received adequate compensation. Unfortunately, the
ad hoc approach to regulatory takings championed by resultsoriented justices, such as William Brennan, stirred this
balancing issue into the general brew of regulatory takings.'
If the regulation fails to leave property owners with a

139. See RogerJ. Marzulla & Nanci G. Marzulla, Regulatoy Takings in the United States
Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in FairnessandEquity Ought to be Borne by Society as
a Whol., 40 OATH. U. L. REv. 549 (1991).
140. See, for example, Allingham v. City of Seattle, 749 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1988), in
which the Washington Supreme Court applied conceptual severance to find a Seattle
"greenbelt" ordinance a taking under the Washington Constitution. The ordinance as
applied eliminated the property owner's ability to use 70% of his property. Of course,
because Washington does not impose an income tax there will be no occasion for the
Washington Supreme Court to apply conceptual severance to the problem of graduated
income tax rates.
141. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (characterizing
regulatory takings doctrine as having no set formula). See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
124.
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reasonable return on their investments, the regulation is almost
certain to be a taking. In theory, there could be a tiny category
of cases in which property owners are left with a return on their
investments that is not "reasonable," but is still "economically
viable." In practice, we are unlikely to see such a case.
If the regulation is arbitrary, it almost certainly will amount to
a taking. However, an arbitrary regulation is also a denial of due
process. As a result, there is no bite to this factor as a unique
element of takings law.
If progressive rate taxation is not regarded as a permanent
dispossession of a disproportionate share of the taxpayer's
income, and is not treated as a destruction of all economically
viable use of that conceptually severed strand of property, there
is not much likelihood that the balancing test will produce a
conclusion that graduated rates are an uncompensated taking.
In the due process context, the Court has rejected the
contention that graduated rates are arbitrary.'
It is
extraordinarily difficult for the judiciary to divine whether a
taxpayer's income, after deduction of the disproportionate
segment of the income tax, represents a "reasonable" return on
the taxpayer's labors and acumen. Any doubts on this score will
surely be resolved in favor of the legislature. Thus, although the
comparison of public benefits and private costs ought not be
germane to the issue, this comparison provides the best
arguments to the taxpayer.
As we have seen, there is no certainty that the public benefits
produced by disproportionate taxation are shared by taxpayers
in the same proportion as their forced contributions.' "4 Nor is
there any reason to be confident that the overall public benefits
of progressive taxation outweigh the private costs imposed by
the practice. Progressive taxation is undertaken in order to
redistribute income from the relatively wealthy to the relatively
poor.1 " This redistribution is often defended on the ground that
it will increase the overall economic welfare of society. "It is
urged that the wealthy will lose less welfare by surrendering a
share of their income than the less wealthy will gain by getting

142. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (income tax);
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance tax).

143. See supratext accompanying notes 94-97.
144. SeeBlum & Kalven, supra note 2, at 486-90.
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it."14 But this argument is nothing more than a restatement of
the minimum sacrifice defense of progressive taxation.11 An
increase in the wealth of the poor will increase societal welfare
only if the utility of the increased wealth to the poor is greater
than the utility of the lost wealth to the rich. This is a highly
debatable premise, regardless of how strongly it may be held
as an article of faith by votaries of the political left.
Moreover, even assuming that there is a net gain in welfare by
redistributing income from rich to poor, there is no proof that
the net gain is in the generalwelfare. "[A]ll that has happened is
that the welfare of one group in the society has been increased
at the expense of the welfare of a different group.... [T]here is
no 'general' welfare; there is only the welfare of the two
groups.""" This sound economic argument, however, faces some
large constitutional obstacles. Ever since United States v. Butle 49
the Court has generally deferred to the congressional judgment
of what constitutes the general welfare. The Court has made
pronouncements on that issue only in the context of testing the
outer boundaries of congressional power to tax or spend. The
Court has never been required to face the related but
conceptually distinct issue of whether the term "general welfare"
has ajudicially ascertainable content as a factor in the balancing
test for regulatory takings. For the regulatory takings balancing
test to mean anything, it is the Court that must make the
judgment of whether the public benefits of progressive taxation
outweigh the private costs imposed. It simply will not do to
pretend that the Court is balancing factors if the Court is simply
accepting congressional judgment about the factors to be
balanced.
Judicial assessment of the costs and benefits produced by
disproportionate taxation is not simple. Given the subjectivity of
any such measurement, it might indeed be prudent to leave this
task to the legislature. If we choose to do this, however, we have
effectively repudiated judicial balancing in regulatory takings, at

145. Id. at 491. A classic defense of this general welfare approach to disproportionate
taxation is Elmer D. Fagan, Recent and Contemporary Theories of Progressive Taxation, 46 J.
POL. ECON. 457 (1938).
146. See supratext accompanying notes 98-104.
147. See supratext accompanying notes 100-101.
148. Blum & aLven, supranote 2, at 491.
149. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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least as applied to progressive taxation. Perhaps the answer to
this dilemma is to require the government to sustain the burden
of proving that the benefits of progressive taxation dearly
outweigh its costs.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Every State has independent constitutional guarantees against
the uncompensated taking of private property for public use.
Many States impose graduated income taxes. Each of these
States is free to assess the validity of progressive state income
taxation under the state takings guarantee, independently of the
federal constitutional law of regulatory takings.
State supreme courts are free to recognize forthrightly that
taxation is bounded by the state takings guarantee, accept the
principle that disproportionate taxation is a permanent
dispossession of intangible property, or embrace conceptual
severance and admit that all economic value is lost with respect
to the marginal increment of income taken by progressive
taxation. All that the courts need is independence of thought.
Decades of acceptance of the assumption that taxation is
immune to any challenge whatsoever under the Takings Clause
has caused judicial minds to close to the inescapable fact that
taxation is a taking. It is surely ajustified and fully compensated
taking when applied proportionally to all taxpayers. However,
the idea of taxing some people at higher rates simply because of
their greater economic success is presumptively offensive to the
principle of the Takings Clause, which "was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole."' The point of the Takings Clause was to prevent
saddling the few with the public burdens that ought to be borne
by the many. If income taxation is the indispensable means of
supporting governmental programs from welfare to missiles,
then the tax burden on incomes-the "taking" from incomeshould be an equal proportion of all income subject to tax.
States are free to implement these basic principles of equality
through their own constitutional law of takings.

150. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has never decided the
question of whether progressive taxation is an uncompensated
taking. Taxation is not, or at least should not be regarded as,
immune from the strictures of the Takings Clause. Indeed, old
dicta from the Court suggests that the Court regards taxation
generally as a fully compensated taking. But that notion, while
generally true, breaks down when applied to progressive
taxation, which seizes a disproportionate share of taxpayer
incomes. The point of the Takings Clause is that public burdens
must be shared by the entire polity rather than placed upon a
select few. Yet progressive taxation does just that, by extracting
an ever larger proportion of income from the select few who
have large incomes.
While it is true that economic regulation is subject to
extremely deferential review under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, the Court has made it very clear that the
standard for regulatory takings is much stricter. Application of
the standard doctrines developed by the Court for regulatory
takings cases reveals that the constitutional case for progressive
taxation is not impressive. The disproportional share of income
taken by progressive rates is a permanent dispossession of
intangible property, a condition the Court has stated triggers an
automatic conclusion that the regulation (progressive tax) is a
taking. Alternatively, if the Court were to accept conceptual
severance as applicable to taxable income, it could conclude
that the portion of income taken by progressive taxation is an
uncompensated taking either because it is a permanent
dispossession or because it deprives the taxpayer of all
economically viable use of that severed strand of property. Even
if the Court's incredibly open-ended balancing test applies,
there is some doubt that the benefits of progressive taxation
outweigh the private costs imposed.
Regardless, States that impose progressive income taxes are
free to reach independent and differing conclusions on these
issues by interpreting their own constitutional provisions
concerning takings of private property for public use. There is
no reason why state supreme courts should refrain from
rigorous analysis of the validity of state progressive taxation
schemes under the various state constitutional takings
provisions.
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It is often said that zen mind is beginner's mind, or that to
gain the "kingdom of God" one must become as a child.
Translated from the spiritual to the temporal, the mental habit
of professionals is frequently to accept uncritically the
unexamined premises underlying the body of professional
knowledge. Lawyers and judges have too long assumed that
taxation is beyond the control of the Takings Clause.'" That
habit of mind occludes understanding. Lawyers and judges are
not the most zen-like creatures. A little zen mind will do them
no harm.

151. See, for example, the following comment about Lucas in a recent student note in
the HarvardLaw Review.
Had the South Carolina Coastal Council taxed Mr. Lucas for the damage he
was doing to the environment, and assessed that damage at an amount that
made it fiscally impossible for him to build a home there, the Council might
have achieved the same results that it attempted to achieve with a regulatory
ban. Yet as a tax, the Council'spolicy would not be subject to scrutiny under the Takings
Clause.
Note, The Principleof Equality in Takings ClauseJurisprudence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1030,
1038 (1996) (emphasis added).

